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Abiy Ahmed’s political agenda of strength via unity calls for an expansion of
federal authority over regionalisation, which has antagonised Ethiopia’s
struggles over national identity. The war in Tigray further in ames these
debates alongside the country’s ethnic tensions, writes Nima Khorrami, and
does nothing to weaken the TPLF’s support in the region. What does this
mean for Ethiopia as a state and how the current crisis might be resolved?
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and former darling of the international community, Abiy
Ahmed, ascended to power on the back of rising tensions between regional
authorities and the Federal government. As a sign of his political ambitions,
Ahmed moved quickly in 2018 to stamp his authority and diminish the power
network in Addis Ababa centred around the mighty military-political faction
representing the Tigrayan minority: the Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF).
Ahmed’s new Prosperity Party (PP) promised sociopolitical reforms and a genuine
push towards democratisation. He ordered the release of political prisoners,
welcomed back exiled opposition  gures and introduced plans to reform the
economy, whereby he alleged to limit the role of the state, and managed to built a
reputation for himself as a peacemaker. Such conditions make his declaration of
war – o cially a law and order operation – on the TPLF both surprising and
contradictory. The Ethiopian leader seems to be undoing much of his own efforts
over the past two years by insisting on increasing the authority of the federal
government.
Ahmed’s entire political agenda of strength via unity, which calls for an expansion
of federal authority over regional affairs, seems to squarely defy the very basic and
fundamental demands of protestors whose desire for greater regionalisation and
expanded authority led to his rise to power. To be sure, Ethiopia’s modern
history has always been marked by a struggle over national identity-building and
the subsequent question of the centre-periphery. In other words, the most constant
and enduring aspect of sociopolitical life in Ethiopia has always revolved around
what some scholars call a war of vision between two sides: those who call for
more regionalisation versus those who favour a more centralised system whereby
federal governments make all the major decisions independent of regional
authorities.
This is why Ahmed’s breaking up of the ruling EPRDF political coalition that
preceded him, and its replacement with his own political party, is now
being seen by some activists and commentators as a cunning move to simply
replace the TPLF and not its modus operandi – that is, to keep the same system in
place with himself at the realm. In the same vein, his privatisation plans as well as
cosmetic societal reforms are, so the argument goes, to primarily serve his own
political ambitions.
Expectedly, Ahmed and his supporters categorically reject such claims as lies and
fabrications, which they may well be. However, his military campaign in Tigray
does nil to calm nerves and reduce ethnic tensions. In fact, there has been
an uptick in ethnically charged clashes since the start of the Tigray campaign, and
the start of Ahmed’s premiership more broadly, with activists in Amhara and
Oromo fearing that the events in Tigray could set a dangerous precedent for the
federal government’s treatment of regional movements in the long-term, if not the
immediate future.
Prospects for the TPLF
The military campaign likewise does not help the federal authorities in achieving
their goal of weakening the TPLF in Tigray and reducing its appeal and in uence
amongst the locals. Not only are the emotional and cultural bonds between the
TPLF and the locals decades old, but the PP itself has no organic presence in the
region. Furthermore, the government’s approval of Eritrean forces and Amhara
militias in the region is nothing short of poisonous for its image and soft powers.
Add to these his refusal to grant aid agencies access to the region – a policy
stance that has led some to accuse him of using starvation as a tactic – and it
then becomes reasonable to assert that the operation is undermining both his
campaign to gain the good will of the locals and, more broadly, his claims to be
wanting to be a leader for all Ethiopians. No wonder the TPLF’s top leadership is
still at large and a guerrilla style con ict seems to have already started. There have
been reports of increased attacks on government’s positions in the north, where
Eritrean forces are stationed, and alongside the transit corridor between Tigray and
the Sudanese border.
Given this situation, the prospect for resuming some degree of normalcy, let alone
peace, is at best distant, especially if the international community continues its
current and indeed unfortunate path of inaction, and to a degree indifference,
towards the con ict. Beside the grim humanitarian situation, which has been
widely reported on, Ethiopia is scheduled to hold an election in June 2021. As of
now, it is unclear whether Tigrayans will be given the chance to cast their ballot.
Given the ongoing con ict, there are reports that there will be no election held
there. On the other hand, it is unclear whether the results would be accepted in the
region even if there were to be elections in Tigray, because the TPLF, as main
political party, has been banned from standing. With regard to other regions, there
are already reports of unfair practices by the ruling PP, which is accused of using
state resources, including media, to run its campaign, thereby putting itself at a
clear advantage compared to its resource deprived opponents.
Needless to say, it is premature to claim that the June votes will be fraudulent in
advance. However, given the current climate of mistrust and ethnic tensions, it is
safe to assume that many will question the results even if votes are casted freely
and counted fairly. This in turn would undermine government legitimacy in the eyes
of segments of the public and could compel it to use force against its opponents
by accusing them of siding with the TPLF or undermining national unity.
Effects on the economy
The ensuing instability and uncertainty, most importantly, would diminish investor
con dence in the country at a time when the Ethiopian economy is already
bleeding from a lack of foreign investment and the negative effects of COVID-19.
Similar to its counterparts around the world, for instance, Ethiopian Airlines is
struggling and the tourism industry is drying up. At the same time, some major
businesses are reported to have either been forced to stop operations due to
increased levels of violence or are actively planning their relocation strategies
should the con ict in Tigray drag on or spread to other regions. Lastly, there are
speculations over whether the government will go ahead with its privatisation plan
for Ethio Telecom given its recently developed habit of shutting down
communication links between the country and outside world as part of its crisis
management strategy.
Regional dimensions of the con ict
Equally worrisome is the evolving regional dimension of the con ict. Relations
between Sudan and Ethiopia, in particular, have been on a downward trajectory
ever since Khartoum sent troops to Fashaga. Although Ahmed played a
constructive role in the immediate aftermath of Sudan’s long-time leader Omar Al
Bashir’s downfall, and notwithstanding Khartoum’s earlier proposal for the
establishment of a joint border patrol force, Sudan has made an opportunistic
move to take advantage of Ethiopian forces’ preoccupation with the con ict in
Tigray and take de facto control of a region that has been traditionally home to
Ethiopian farmers since 1995.
In response, Ethiopia has warned of retaliation and refused to participate in any
talks until Sudanese forces have departed from the region; a demand that is highly
unlikely to be met by Sudan. For its part, Khartoum has now changed its stance on
the Nile dam issue, essentially causing the failure of the last round of talks by
refusing, in spite of its initial agreement, to agree to the presence of the African
Union’s technical experts at the negotiations.
As such, there is now a real fear of a joint Egyptian Sudanese cooperation to assist
the TPLF by providing a safe haven for its leadership and resources for its  ghters
to prolong the con ict. Cairo and Khartoum now share a common desire to
increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis Addis Ababa, albeit for different reasons:
while Cairo is keen on extracting favourable concessions from Ethiopia with regard
to the dam and its  lling, Sudan sees a once in a life-time opportunity in the current
con ict to settle the border question once and for all.
The mere possibility of a military confrontation bene ts the Sudanese armed
forces in its current tussle with the civilian government over political in uence.
Further, the fact that the TPLF leadership already has a network of friends in
Khartoum in conjuncture with the recent increase in the frequency of TPLF attacks
on government positions along the transit corridor between Sudan and Tigray
could indicate that this cooperation may already be taking place. Add to this
the reduced international and regional commitment to Somalia’s security and the
resulting surge in Al Shabab activities in the run up to what is promising to be a
highly contested election, combined with uncertainty over the intentions of Eritrean
forces inside Ethiopia, and it becomes clear why the Tigray con ict could become
the catalyst for further instability in the Horn.
Routes to resolve the crisis
Looking ahead, there is a strong possibility that Ethiopia could undergo the types
of events and in ghting that erupted, and in a sense characterised, the
sociopolitical life of the country between the 1970s and early 1990s, which led to
the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. As the election month approaches, the
economy further stagnates and trust between and within ethnic and communal
groups and federal authorities erodes, it is not unreasonable to expect both the
emergence and radicalisation of student and youth led movements across the
country. Indeed there is a strong tendency for populist politics centred around
ethnicity, nationalism and national security.
To avert the worse, the international community needs urgently to bring the
warring sides to the negotiating table. Given that both the US and China have
vested interests in the stability of Ethiopia and the wider Horn, Ethiopia represents
a case where they can cooperate in pursuit of a common cause. In fact, the
con ict in Ethiopia can be used to test the viability of President Biden’s China
strategy and whether Beijing and Washington can cooperate with each other when
their interests merge.
Prime Minister Ahmed needs to realise that the more he rejects international
mediation and blocks access to the region out of a desire to not internationalise
the con ict, the more, rather paradoxically, internationalised the con ict will
become. Yes the TPLF must not be allowed to take the country’s territorial integrity
hostage by threatening secession if its maximalist demands for near total
autonomy are not met. However, its total elimination is also not a realistic
objective; it is deep rooted in Tigray’s sociopolitical fabric and still enjoys a
relatively high degree of popularity amongst Tigrayans.
As a result, a creative combination of the South African and Emirati models could
provide a viable way forward. They both recognise the importance of local/tribal
identity and the right to its preservation. Yet, they also prioritise national allegiance
over and above ethnic or tribal royalties, and thus they allow for the construction
and strengthening of both national and local identities in tandem with each other
and not in opposition.
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